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INTRODUCTION
The COVID-19 pandemic has underscored the essential nature of accurate, accessible
diagnostic tests for their critical roles in public health surveillance and clinical care. Access to
accurate and reliable testing to identify individuals exposed to or infected with a rapid spreading
disease is critical to an effective public health response. The lack of adequate COVID-19 testing
at the outset of the pandemic foreclosed the country’s opportunities to stop widespread community
transmission of the disease, and exacerbated its consequences.1 As a result of controversies over
COVID-19 testing, the profile of in vitro clinical diagnostics tests has been dramatically elevated
from the shadow of therapeutic products.
In response to this public health crisis, members of Congress introduced legislation with
the aim of preventing a similar dearth of testing during future emergencies. On March 5, 2020, the
Verifying Accurate Leading-edge IVCT Development (VALID) Act of 2020 was introduced by
House Representatives Diana DeGette (D-CO) and Larry Bucshon, MD (R-IN),2 with an identical
bill introduced in the Senate by U.S. Senators Michael Bennet (D-CO) and Richard Burr (R-NC)
3

. The VALID Act is a comprehensive diagnostic reform bill, which creates a new class of product

within the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) jurisdiction called in vitro clinical tests (IVCTs)
to include both in vitro diagnostic products (IVDs)4 manufactured by the conventional device
manufacturers and those developed and used within a single clinical laboratory, i.e. laboratory-

1

Michael Shear et al., The Lost Month: How a Failure to Test Blinded the U.S. to Covid-19, N.Y. Times (Mar. 28,
2020). https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/28/us/testing-coronavirus-pandemic.html
2
VALID Act of 2020, H.R. 6102, 116th Cong. (2020).
3
VALID Act of 2020, S. 3404, 116th Cong. (2020).
4
21 C.F.R. § 809.3. IVD is defined as in vitro diagnostic products are reagents, instruments, and systems intended for
use in diagnosis of disease or other conditions, including a determination of the state of health, in order to cure,
mitigate, treat, or prevent disease or its sequelae. Such products are intended for use in the collection, preparation, and
examination of specimens taken from the human body.
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developed tests (LDTs)5. To leverage the learning from the COVID-19 testing, the FDA also
joined Congress’s reform efforts on legislation beyond emergency rules and responses, calling for
“a common legislative framework to ensure that all clinical tests are accurate and reliable.”6
Also, in March and in response to the COVID testing challenges, Senator Rand Paul (RKY) induced the Verified Innovative Testing in American Laboratories Act of 2020 (VITAL Act)
that assigns the responsibility of overseeing the regulation of LDTs to the Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services (CMS) instead of FDA, including during a declared emergency.7
To certain degree, these bills are the continuation of a long-standing (over twenty years)
debate8 over whether diagnostic tests are best regulated by a single agency (FDA) under the Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)9, or by a dual system—LDTs developed at clinical laboratories
are regulated by CMS under the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988 (CLIA)10
and IVDs developed by device manufacturers are regulated by FDA under FDCA. Proponents for
the a common regulatory framework argue that the current dual system creates federal gaps in
regulatory oversight because CLIA does not require clinical validity assessment of LDTs. They
contended that “[m]odern LTDs are often complex, have a nationwide reach, and high-risk uses
and without oversight could present risks for patients and healthcare professionals who rely on the

5

U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Draft Guidance for Industry, Food and Drug Administration Staff, and Clinical
Laboratories: Framework for Regulatory Oversight of Laboratory Developed Tests (LDTs), 5 (Oct. 3, 2014).
https://www.fda.gov/media/89841/download
6
Shuren, infra note 19.
7
VITAL Act of 2020, S. 3512, 116th Cong. (2020).
8
See, e.g., Gail H. Javitt, In Search of a Coherent Framework: Options for FDA Oversight of Genetic Tests, 62
Food & Drug L.J. 617 (2007); Deborah G.B. Leonard, The FDA is Coming! The FDA is Coming! 6 Molecular
Diagnosis 153 (2001) (editorial).
9
21 U.S.C. § 321(h).
10
42 U.S.C. § 263a; see also Laboratory Requirements, 42 C.F.R. § 493 (regulations implementing CLIA).
Page 3 of 31

Gaozhen Hang

results of LDTs to make medical decisions.”11 In the COVID-19 context, they readily pointed to
the poor quality of unregulated LDTs to support their view.12 On the other hand, proponents for
the dual regulatory system argue that FDA oversight is duplicative with CLIA regulations, and the
inefficient FDA processes led to the delayed COVID-19 response.13
The COVID-19 pandemic may be the “final straw” that overcomes the legislative inertia
to end this long-standing legislation debate once and for all. Unraveling this debate requires
understanding the interaction between the current regulatory structure as well as the competing
interests among all stakeholders. Section I of this paper recounts the lessons learned from the
COVID-19 testing crisis. These lessons should guide policy and practice to ensure timely access
to accurate, high-quality, and innovative testing. Section II identifies the gaps and inconsistencies
in the current regulatory framework. Section III describes how the common legislative framework
proposed by VALID Act would address the issues in the current system to ensure safety,
effectiveness and timely access to a board range of diagnostic tests. Section V proposes further
development and refinement of VALID Act to eliminate redundancy, build regulatory flexibility
and agility, and strengthen postmarket enforcement powers.

11

Examining the Regulation of Diagnostic Tests and Laboratory Operations, Hearing Before the S. Comm. On
Health, 144th Cong. (2015) (statement of Jeffery Shuren, M.D., J.D., Director, Center for Devices and Radiological
Health, Food and Drug Administration, Department of Health and Human Services).
12
Shuren, supra note 19.
13
See Association for Molecular Pathology Commends Senator Rand Paul for Introducing the Verified Innovative
Testing in American Laboratories (VITAL) Act of 2020 (Mar.18, 2020)
https://www.amp.org/AMP/assets/File/pressreleases/2020/VITAL_2020_PR_AMP__3_18_2020.pdf?pass=67
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I.

Learning from the COVID-19 Diagnostic Testing Crisis
On January 31, 2020, the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) declared a

public health emergency due to a severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV2) outbreak in the U.S.14 On February 4, 2020, FDA received emergency authority to expedite
public access to COVID-19 diagnostic tests under emergency use authorization (EUA).15 On the
same day, FDA granted an EUA to the first COVID-19 test developed by the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC).16 The CDC test is a molecular test designed to identify the genetic
material of SARS-CoV-2. FDA chose to limit the initial approval to the CDC test for the purpose
of ensuring accurate surveillance testing by the state and local public health laboratories.17 It was
later discovered that the early batch of the CDC test that produced inclusive or invalid results was
contaminated.18 Pressured by the unmet need to rapidly expand testing capacities for COVID-19
screening and clinical care, on February 29, 2020, FDA issued a policy to allow qualified
laboratories to perform patient testing provided they submitted the validation data in EUA requests
within fifteen business days.19 Although this approach resulted in earlier access to COVID-19
testing, the delayed FDA EUA review and the less-vigorous standards allowed the clinical use of

14

U.S. Dep't Health & Hum. Servs., Alex M. Azar II, Determination that a Public Health Emergency Exists, (Jan.
31, 2020). https://www.phe.gov/emergency/news/healthactions/phe/Pages/2019-nCoV.aspx
15
85 Fed. Reg. 7316 (Feb. 7, 2020).
16
U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Letter from RADM Denise M. Hinton, Chief Scientist, to Robert R. Redfield, Director,
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Mar. 2, 2020). https://www.fda.gov/media/135763/download
17
Joshua M. Sharfstein et al., Diagnostic Testing for the Novel Coronavirus JAMA 323(15), 1437 (2020). Under the
Project Bioshield Act of 204, the FDA has broad discretion about which laboratory test can be used for the response
during declared emergencies.
18
ABC News, EXCLUSIVE: Internal HHS investigation finds CDC's early test kits were 'contaminated' (Jun. 19,
2020). https://abc3340.com/news/nation-world/exclusive-internal-hhs-investigation-finds-cdcs-early-test-kits-werecontaminated
19
Jeffery Shuren & Timothy Stenzel, Covid-19 Molecular Diagnostic Testing—Lessons Learned, N Engl J Med
383:17 (2020).
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some tests with performance problems.20 According to FDA, 82 out of 125 EUA requests from the
laboratories were identified with design or validation problems, and several were denied
authorization.21 Recognizing the potential safety risks, FDA did not apply this relaxed “test-first
and EUA-later” policy to the COVID-19 tests developed by commercial manufacturers, and the
first commercial COVID-19 test did not receive EUAs until mid-March 2020 due to a large
backlog of EUAs.22
Timely access to accurate and reliable COVID-19 testing has proven to be central to
effective public health measures during the pandemic. Evidence suggests that containment of
COVID-19 may depend on early case detection and contact tracing.23 For example, Taiwan has
been able to limit COVID-19 spread to only a few hundred confirmed cases among its 24 million
population through proactive testing and contact tracing.24 In contrast, a testing delay as short as
three days has shown to make the most efficient contact tracing strategy for COVID-19
ineffective.25 The one-month delay in rolling out reliable COVID-19 testing at the onset of the

20

See e.g., Laurie McGinley, Dozens of coronavirus antibody tests on the market were never vetted by the FDA,
leading to accuracy concerns, Wash. Post, (Apr. 19, 2020) https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/04/19/fdaantibody-tests-coronavirus-review/; Zachary Brennan & David Lim, FDA pushed through scores of inaccurate
antibody tests without agency review, Politico (Apr. 27, 2020); https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/27/reliableantibody-tests-coronavirus-207589 (accessed on March 19, 2021); Thomas Burton, FDA Sets Standards for
Coronavirus Antibody Tests in Crackdown on Fraud, Wall Street J, (May 4, 2020)..
https://www.wsj.com/articles/fda-sets-standards-for-coronavirus-antibody-tests-in-crackdown-on-fraud11588605373
21
Shuren, infra note 19.
22
U.S. Food & Drug Admin., In Vitro Diagnostics EUAs. https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/coronavirusdisease-2019-covid-19-emergency-use-authorizations-medical-devices/in-vitro-diagnostics-euas#individualmolecular
23
Joel Hellewell et al., Feasibility of controlling COVID-19 outbreaks by isolation of cases and contacts. Lancet
Glob Health. 2020; S2214-109X (20)30074-7 (2020).
24
C. Jason Wang et al., Response to COVID-19 in Taiwan. JAMA 323(14): 1341 (2020).
25
Mirjam E Kretzschmar et. al., Impact of delays on effectiveness of contact tracing strategies for COVID-19: a
modelling study, The Lancet Public Health 5: e452 (2020).
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pandemic hampered the country’s ability to contain the spread of this highly contagious virus in
the communities,26 not to mention the dangers that faulty diagnostic tests can pose to patient care.27
In response to the public criticism for the slow rollout of COVID-19 tests, FDA carried out
a “postmortem” analysis on the initial test shortage.28 The lessons learned include, among others,
“a common legislative framework is needed to ensure that all clinical tests are accurate and
reliable.”29

26

See Michael Shear et al., The Lost Month: How a Failure to Test Blinded the U.S. to Covid-19, N.Y. Times (Mar.
28, 2020); https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/28/us/testing-coronavirus-pandemic.html; James Glanz & Campbell
Robertson, Lockdown Delays Cost at Least 36,000 Lives, Data Show, N.Y. Times (May 20, 2020).
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/20/us/coronavirus-distancing-deaths.html
27
Steven Woloshin et al., False Negative Tests for SARS-CoV-2 Infection —Challenges and Implications, N Engl J
Med 383:6 (2020).
28
Shuren, supra note 19.
29
Id.
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II.

Current Regulatory Framework for IVDs
Unique Aspects of IVDs
One of the paradoxes of IVD regulations is that IVDs simply do not fit well into the existing

medical device regulatory structure. Although IVDs are “devices” under FDCA,30 they are in many
ways distinct from traditional medical devices in terms of their product characteristics and
regulatory nuances. On many occasions, FDA needed to craft creative regulatory approaches to
adhere to the general medical device regulatory framework while regulating IVDs effectively.
First, unlike other medical devices IVDs do not have direct contact with the patient, so they
cannot affect the structure or function of the body. Rather, IVDs are non-invasive tests performed
on blood or tissue samples outside the human body, i.e., in vitro. Both the benefits and the risks of
IVDs derive from the diagnostic information that they provide. For example, FDA has adopted
two IVD-specific standards to evaluate whether an IVD meets the “reasonable safety and
effectiveness” premarket requirement: (1) analytical validity, referring to how accurately and
precisely a diagnostic measures its intended analyte; and (2) clinical validity, describing how well
a diagnostic can characterize or predict a patient’s health status.31 In the IVD context, it is critical
to assess both analytical and clinical validity because erroneous information provided by a
diagnostic test may lead to harmful clinical decisions.32

30

FDCA § 201(h)(2), 21 U.S.C. § 321(h)(2). The definition of device in the FDCA includes “an . . . in vitro reagent
. . . intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions . . .”
31
U.S. Dep't Health & Hum. Servs., Report of the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society,
U.S. System of Oversight of Genetic Testing: A Response to the Charge of the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, 96-98 (Apr. 2008). https://osp.od.nih.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/SACGHS_oversight_report.pdf
32
U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Risk of False Results with the Curative SARS-Cov-2 Test for COVID-19: FDA Safety
Communication (Jan. 4, 2021). https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/safety-communications/risk-false-resultscurative-sars-cov-2-test-covid-19-fda-safety-communication
Page 8 of 31

Gaozhen Hang

Second, IVDs are technologically distinct from other medical devices. Most IVDs include
not only software-controlled electronic equipment, but also biochemical materials, such as
reagents, controls, and calibrators.33 The technical expertise required to review and regulate IVDs
is therefore different from that for other types of medical devices. This is evident that while most
scientific reviewers in the Center of Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH) have engineering
background, the Office of Health Technology 7 (OHT7: In Vitro Diagnostics and Radiological
Health—OIR) are predominantly staffed with laboratorians, biochemists, molecular biologists,
and microbiologists.34 Accordingly, what constitutes “valid scientific evidence” to OHT7
reviewers may sound foreign to the scientific reviewers from the rest of CDRH since different
terminology is used to convey that a clinical test is safe and effective. Further, IVD review heavily
relies on the recognized consensus standards for test validation, specifically those promulgated by
the Clinical and Laboratory Standard Institute (CLSI).35
Third, IVDs do not fit well in FDA’s predominant regulatory pathway to market—
premarket notification, or 510(k).36 FDA classifies all medical devices including IVDs into class
I, II or III based on the level of control necessary to provide “reasonable assurance of safety and
effectiveness.”37 The applicable regulatory pathway is primarily determined by the risk associated
with an IVD, as established by its classification. Most class II and a minority of class I devices

33

21 C.F.R. § 809.3.
U.S. Food & Drug Admin., CDRH Management Directory by Organization. https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/cdrhoffices/cdrh-management-directory-organization
35
U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Recognized Consensus Standards
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfstandards/search.cfm
36
Institute of Medicine (IOM), Medical Devices and the Public’s Health: The FDA 510(k) Clearance Process at 35
Year, 4 (2011). In fiscal year 2020, FDA issued 2,259 510(k) clearances and 38 PMA approvals. Agenda for
Quarterly Meeting on MDUFA IV (FY 2018-2020) Performance, 36, 127, (Mar. 17, 2021).
https://www.fda.gov/media/146795/download
37
FDCA § 513(a)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1).
34
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require 510(k) clearance, which requires a finding of “substantial equivalence” to another legally
marketed device—a predicate.38 The 510(k) process involves a comparison of a new device to a
predicate rather than an independent demonstration of the new device’s safety and effectiveness,
as required for a class III device premarket approval (PMA).39 This comparative review approach
is intended to ensure controlled technological evolution of a broad range of moderate risk devices,
as the newly cleared devices become the baseline for future comparison.40
In contrast, the use of predicate in IVD 510(k) clearance is curtailed due to the unique
performance requirements of IVDs. As mentioned previously, an IVD’s performance is measured
by its analytical and clinical validity. The results obtained from different IVDs to measure the
same substance must be equivalent and within clinical meaningful limits, i.e., the maximal allowed
variability without affecting patient care.41 Ideally, IVD performance is established by comparing
with the “truth,” which is typically a reference method or a harmonized test traceable to a reference
method or reference materials.42
As a result, “paper predicate” are commonly used in IVD 510(k)s. A paper predicate is a
predicate that has the same intended use as the new device, but it is not used for head-to-head
performance comparison with the new device to establish its substantial equivalence to the

38

21 C.F.R § 807 Subpart E.
21 C.F.R § 814.
40
Accordingly, more recent predicates are generally preferred because FDA has expressed some concern about the
use of older predicates in 510(k) clearance. FDA statement, Statement from FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D.
and Jeff Shuren, M.D., Director of the Center for Devices and Radiological Health, on transformative new steps to
modernize FDA’s 510(k) program to advance the review of the safety and effectiveness of medical devices (Nov. 26,
2018). https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/statement-fda-commissioner-scott-gottlieb-md-andjeff-shuren-md-director-center-devices-and.
41
Miller et al., Roadmap for harmonization of clinical laboratory measurement procedures. Clin Chem 2011. 57:
1118-1126.
42
American Ass’n for Clinical Chemistry, Harmonization of Clinical Laboratory Test Results,
https://www.aacc.org/advocacy-and-outreach/position-statements/2018/harmonization-of-clinical-laboratory-testresults-update
39
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predicate. Rather, the performance of a new device is directly compared to a well-established
reference method. This alternative regulatory approach adheres 510(k) requirements while meeting
the unique IVD regulatory needs. FDA achieved this rule tweak by issuing discretionary “special
controls” guidance for Class II devices. The special control guidance permits a variety of measures
in FDA’s discretion, including but not limited to, performance standards, reference method and
clinical data requirements.43 Further, unlike other medical device 510(k)s, of which only a minority
need to submit clinical data, many IVD 510(k)s include clinical data from perspective studies or
studies that use leftover clinical samples or “banked” samples.44
Finally, the classification regulation for IVDs depends on the intended use45 of an IVD at
the “test system” level. Although there is no general statutory or regulatory definition of test
system, analyte-specific test systems are typically classified and defined with a specific clinical
indication for use in the regulation. For example, Hemoglobin A1c Test System is classified as class
II and indicated as “an aid in the diagnosis of diabetes mellitus and as an aid in the identification
of patients at risk for developing diabetes mellitus” under 21 C.F.R. §862.1373. But the
spectrophotometer designed to use with this hemoglobin A1c test is classified as class I, and
exempted from premarket review.46 This apparent “deregulation” of IVD instrument, however,
does not create a regulatory gap, because the test system performance cannot be evaluated alone

43

On May 7, 2021, a total of 127 draft and final guidance documents are listed as Class II Special Controls
Documents. https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/guidance-documents-medical-devices-and-radiation-emittingproducts/class-ii-special-controls-documents.
44
U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Guidance for Sponsors, Institutional Review Boards, and Food and Drug
Administration Staff: Guidance on Informed Consent for In Vitro Diagnostic Device Studies Using Leftover Human
Specimens that are Not Individually Identifiable (Apr. 25, 2006). https://www.fda.gov/media/122648/download.
45
21 C.F.R § 864.4020.
46
See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 862. 2300 Colorimeter, Photometer, Spectrophotometer For Clinical Use.
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without the associated instrument. In fact, most IVD instruments undergo rigorous FDA premarket
review with the associated tests.
In short, fitting IVDs into the medical device regulations has always been like trying to fit
a square peg into a round hole.
Fragmented LDT Oversight under CLIA
While FDA has managed to fit IVDs into the medical device regulatory framework with a
few rule tweaks, the fragmented LDT oversight is more problematic because it creates regulatory
gaps and inconsistencies among diagnostic tests developed by manufacturers and clinical
laboratories. The fragmented LDT regulatory framework is in part due to the federal regulatory
gaps within CLIA.
CLIA defines a clinical laboratory as a facility that “examines materials collected from the
human body for the purpose of providing information for the diagnosis, prevention, or treatment
of disease or for health assessment.”47 CLIA is administered by CMS in partnership with the states.
Under CLIA, a clinical laboratory must hold one of five types of certificates, depending on the
“complexity” of the testing performed by the laboratory (i.e., the difficulty of and level of training
needed to correctly perform the test).48 The goal of CLIA is to ensure that the laboratory can
produce accurate, reliable, and timely test results. The regulations address the qualifications and
training of laboratory personnel, recordkeeping, quality control processes, and proficiency testing.
The CLIA regulatory framework places significant responsibility on the laboratory director to
ensure that all phases of testing are properly performed.49 By controlling the quality of laboratory

47

42 U.S.C. § 263a.
42 C.F.R. § 493.1773.
49
42 C.F.R. § 493.1445.
48
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practices, CLIA standards are designed to ensure the analytical validity of the tests.50 Clinical
laboratories that do not comply with the CLIA regulations may be subject to sanctions, civil money
penalties, civil lawsuits, imprisonment, or a criminal fine.51
As a statute primarily designed to regulate laboratory practices rather than test
development, CLIA does not include any independent assessment of the clinical validity of the
tests offered by the laboratory.52 Many state policymakers point to this gap within CLIA as one of
the main reasons for placing additional safeguard to oversight LDTs. Two states, New York and
Washington, have replaced the CLIA certification requirements with their own state licensing
regulatory regime. Clinical laboratories in these states are CLIA-exempt because CMS has
determined that the state requirements are equal to or more stringent than the CLIA requirements,
but laboratories must obtain the appropriate state license.53 Several other states require state
laboratory licensure in additional to CLIA certification.54
In addition, state licensing requirements may apply if a laboratory receives samples from
and/or reports results to that state. For example, New York requires that all clinical laboratories
accepting samples from and reporting results to New York state residents must hold a New York
state permit.55 New York also requires laboratories to obtain approval for all tests performed by
the laboratory on samples originating from New York. Depending on the type of test (e.g., FDA-

50

See What is CMS’ authority regarding Laboratory Developed Tests (LDTs) and how does it differ
from FDA’s authority? (Oct. 22, 2013) https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-andGuidance/Legislation/CLIA/Downloads/LDT-and-CLIA_FAQs.pdf
51
42 C.F.R. § 493.1806.
52
See supra note 50.
53
N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 574; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 70.42.020.
54
E.g., Alabama (Ala. Admin. Code § 420-5-8); California (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 1256(a)(1)); Georgia (Ga.
Code Ann. § 31-22-20; Kentucky (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 333.030); Nevada (Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 652.080); Rhode
Island (R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 23-16.2).
55
N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 574.
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cleared or approved, CLIA-waived, LDT etc.), laboratories are generally required to submit both
analytical and clinical validation data.56 In general, the submitted data must be generated in the
same laboratory from which a test will be offered.
Since CMS interprets CLIA’s mandate to assure “the validity and reliability of the
laboratory examinations”57 as requiring laboratories to establish analytical validity, it has not acted
to explicitly require laboratory practices to verify the clinical evidence underlying tests performed.
While these state LDT regulations may fill this federal clinical validity gap, the level of LDT
oversight is lacking, or at most inconsistent across states.
Fluid FDA Authority Over LDTs
Meanwhile, the current FDA LDT regulatory regime remains fluid. On one hand, FDCA
grants the FDA authority to regulate IVDs as a subcategory of medical devices.58 FDA has long
taken the position that it has jurisdiction over LDTs. In a response denying a citizen petition
submitted by the American Clinical Laboratory Association (ACLA) challenging FDA’s
regulation of LDTs, FDA stated that (1) the statutory definition of IVD includes LDTs; (2)
laboratories performing LDTs are medical device manufacturers and do not fall within the
“practice of medicine” exemption; (3) CMS and FDA have “concurrent, complementary
jurisdiction” over laboratories that manufacture LDTs; and (4) FDA may issue enforcement policy
for LDTs through guidance process, rather than through notice-and-comment rulemaking.59 Some

56

See N.Y. Dep’t. of Health, Wadsworth Ctr., Test Approval, https://www.wadsworth.org/regulatory/clep/clinicallabs/obtain-permit/test-approval.
57
42 U.S.C. § 263a(f)(1)(A).
58
21 C.F.R. § 809.3(a).
59
U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Citizen Petition Denial Response, Docket No. FDA-2013-P-0667-0008 (Jul. 31,
2014).
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LDTs have already received approvals and clearances from FDA—meaning they must be medical
devices (as these forms of marketing authorization are reserved for devices).60
On the other hand, nothing in the legislative history or the language in law suggests that
Congress contemplated FDA would be overseeing clinical laboratories. FDA have yet formally
promulgated the criteria for what constitutes an LDT. In fact, the term LDT was not even used by
FDA in an official document until 2007.61 The 2014 draft guidance defining LDT as “an IVD that
is intended for clinical use and designed, manufactured, and used within a single laboratory” is
never finalized.62 In general, FDA exercises enforcement discretion not requiring LDTs to undergo
premarket. Clinical laboratories traditionally have taken the position that the proprietary LDTs that
they develop are “services” and not “products” and therefore are subject only to CMS regulation
under CLIA.63 Clinical laboratories pushed back when FDA decided to exercise its enforcement
power, protesting that LDTs constitute practice of medicine rather than medical products subject
to FDA review.64 The same argument was used to criticize FDA’s assertion of its authority over
COVID-19 LDTs.65

60

In fiscal year 2020, FDA issued three LDT 510(k) clearances and nine LDT PMA approvals. Agenda for
Quarterly Meeting on MDUFA IV (FY 2018-2020) Performance, 40, 129 (Mar. 17, 2021).
https://www.fda.gov/media/146795/download.
61
U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Draft Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staff: In Vitro
Diagnostic Multivariate Index Assays, 72 Fed. Reg. 41,081, 41,082 (Jul. 26, 2007).
62
U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Draft Guidance for Industry, Food and Drug Administration Staff, and Clinical
Laboratories: Framework for Regulatory Oversight of Laboratory Developed Tests (LDTs), 5 (Oct. 3, 2014)
https://www.fda.gov/media/89841/download
63
42 U.S.C. § 263a; see also Laboratory Requirements, 42 C.F.R. § 493 (regulations implementing CLIA).
64
See e.g., Paul D. Clement & Laurence H. Tribe, Am. Clinical Laboratory Ass’n, Laboratory Testing Services, As
the Practice Medicine, Cannot Be Regulated as Medical Devices (2015). https://www.acla.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/01/Tribe-Clement-White-Paper-1-6-15.pdf
65
See Evans BJ. & Clayton EW, Deadly Delay: The FDA’s Role in America’s COVID-Testing Debacle¸ 130 Yale
L.J. Forum 78 (Jul. 29, 2020).
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To further complicate this matter, HHS issued and later withdrew a directive on its website
stating that FDA did not have the premarket review authority of LDTs “absent notice-andcomment rulemaking.”66 The directive was characterized as a “recession” of guidances and other
“informal issuances” aimed at FDA’s prior attempts to use guidance to provide a regulatory
framework for LDTs. Although HHS later issued an FAQ document on its website further
elaborating on the reason for and impact of the announcement67, it is still unclear as to exactly how
HHS interprets the applicability of FDCA to LDTs. Perhaps, HHS’s rationale is that there is
sufficient ambiguity as to exactly which LDTs are subject to the requirements of FDCA (i.e., which
LDTs are devices), and under what circumstances, that rulemaking should be issued to offer a
reasoned interpretation of the statute in lieu of the widespread application of enforcement
discretion via informal guidance.
HHS was essentially encouraging FDA to engage in rulemaking perhaps to mitigate the
risk of any foreseeable litigation. Since FDA’s assertion of authority over LDTs has never been
challenged in litigation, no court has evaluated the agency’s informal interpretation of FDA’s
statutory authority over LDTs. Case law generally holds that Chevron deference does not apply to
all agency interpretations of agency-administrated statutes.68 Judicial deference may only be
afforded to an agency’s statutory interpretation promulgated via formal or notice-and-comment
rulemaking. Further, if FDA engages notice-and-comment rulemaking, it can overrule court’s
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U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human, Servs., Recission of Guidance and Other Informal Issuances Concerning
Premarket Review of Laboratory Developed Tests (Aug. 19, 2020) (withdrawn).
https://www.hhs.gov/coronavirus/testing/recission-guidances-informal-issuances-premarket-review-labtests/index.html
67
Cong. Research Servs., HHS Announcement on FDA Premarket Review of Laboratory-Developed Tests (LDTs)
(Dec. 3, 2020). https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11548
68
See U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (holding that Chevron deference did not apply to statutory
interpretations adopted in the informal tariff classification ruling letters).
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decision.69. But history suggests that it would be very challenging and time consuming for FDA to
initiate rulemaking on LDT regulation.70
The HHS’s “recission statement” itself amounts to non-binding informal guidance, and
HHS itself is not bound by it. Even after the statement was removed from the HHS website, it may
be challenging to issue a revised statement, because doing so would potentially require HHS and
FDA to develop a more specific position on LDTs, which they were not able to do successfully for
number of years. Thus, this HHS directive would create more Congressional interest in IVD
legislative reform discussions.

69

See National Cable & Telecom Services Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
See supra note 61. FDA failed several attempts to finalize LDT standards, and the latest attempt was the 2014
draft LDT guidance.

70
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III.

A Common Legislative Framework for IVCTs
A New Class of Medical Product — IVCT
The draft VALID Act directly addresses the issue that the medical device regulatory

framework is not a good fit for clinical diagnostic tests. As mentioned previously, diagnostics
differ greatly from conventional medical devices in terms of product characteristics, and this
distinction should be reflected in the regulatory approach. To make a distinction between
diagnostics and other types of medical devices, VALID created a new class of medical product
within FDA’s jurisdiction, which is defined as “in vitro clinical test” (IVCT). The term IVCT
broadly includes all tests, both traditional IVDs and LDTs. Under VALID, an IVCT would mean
“a test intended by its developer . . . to be used in collection,
preparation, analysis, or in vitro clinical examination of specimens
taken or derived from human body for the purpose of—
(i) identifying or diagnosing a disease or condition;
(ii) providing information for diagnosing, screening,
measuring, detecting, predicting, prognosing, analyzing, or
monitoring a disease or condition, including by making
determination of an individual’s state of health; or
(iii) selecting, monitoring, or informing therapy or treatment
for a disease or condition; and
(B) may include—
(i) a test protocol or laboratory protocol;
(ii) an instrument [];
(iii) article for taking or deriving, holding, or transporting
specimens from the human body [];
(iv) software, excluding software . . . ; and
(v) [], a component or part of a test, a test protocol, an
instrument, an article, or software . . . , whether alone or in
combination, including reagent, calibrators, and controls.”71

71

VALID Act Section 2 Definitions (amending FDCA Definitions section 201).
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IVCTs would be regulated separately from medical devices. But this new medical product
class would remain under the authority of FDA’s existing medical device review center, i.e.,
CDRH because FDA expressed the concern that a new review center would require significant
financial resources that would be covered by the federal government funding and/or user fees.72
VALID would use a classification scheme similar to the existing three-tier risk
classification used for medical devices, except that the bill only defined two risk categories: low
risk and high risk. The risk description is tailored to IVCTs. It is based on (1) harm to the patient
if the test produced an inaccurate result, (2) the likelihood of harm coming to a patient, (3) how
well the technology is characterized, and (3) whether other confirmatory tests were involved in
treatment decision making. Low-risk IVCTs are those that would likely cause minimal or no harm
from inaccurate results, which would be exempted from premarket review. High-risk IVCTs are
those that would likely cause serious or irreversible harm or death from an inaccurate result, which
would require premarket review. A subcategory of high-risk IVCTs with “risk mitigation
measures” would be eligible for the novel “technology certification” pathway.73
The elimination of moderate risk class signals the bill sponsors’ and stakeholders’
preference to move away from the controversial medical device 510(k) program.74 While the
premarket notification pathway (510(k)) was originally intended as a stopgap for regulating

72

U.S. Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs., Technical Assistance on VALID Act of 2018 (Apr. 2019),
https://dx.advamed.org/sites/dx.advamed.org/files/resource/hhs-technical-assistance-fda_cdc_cms-feedback-onvalid-act-apr2019.pdf.
73
See infra section III B Premarket Review Pathway and Technology Certification.
74
U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staff: The 510(k) Program:
Evaluating Substantial Equivalence in Premarket Notifications [510(k)], (July 2014).
https://www.fda.gov/media/82395/download
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moderate risk devices,75 the daisy-chain type “substantial equivalence” review standard is much
criticized as a “regulatory loophole” exploited by device manufacturers.76 As discussed in Section
II A, this 510(k) pathway is less of a concern in the context of diagnostics because IVD
manufactures are often required to independently demonstrate analytical and clinical validity
against the “truth,” i.e. reference methods or standards.77 IVCT seem to be an ideal candidate for
Congress to experiment whether it can wean FDA from its dependence on the 510(k) program.
Finally, VALID introduced a category of IVCTs as first-of-a-kind (FOAK). FOAK is an
IVCT with both a different intended use and indications for use than any legally marketed IVCT.
FOAK IVCTs are presumed to be high risk and not eligible for abbreviated form of review (special
premarket review) or technology certification. Although FDA could redesignate FOAK IVCTs as
low risk IVCTs, the redesignation would only take place after the review has occurred.
In summary, the proposed common regulatory framework establishes a one-size-fits-all,
risk-based approach that is tailor fit to oversight all IVCTs. This means that a single premarket
review standard would apply to all tests, regardless of where the test is designed, developed,
manufactured, or offered. Diagnostic regulators would no longer need to resort to creative rule
tweaking to fit IVCTs into medical device regulations.

75

The Medical Device Amendment of 1976 mandated that FDA would review all existing types of medical devices
by regulation place them in Class I, II, or III. Class II devices would be subject to FDA-established performance
standards plus genera postmarket controls. It took FDA 14 years to complete classification, and few performance
standards have been issued. See 90 Sat. at 540-552, See e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 1000.
76
See e.g., B. Goldberg, The Evolution of Substantial Equivalence in FDA’s Premarket Review of Medical Devices,
56 Food & Drug L.J. 317, 318, 330 (2001); M. Van Buren, Closing the Loopholes in the Regulation of Medical
Devices: The Need for Congress to Reevalute Medical Device Regulation, 17 Health Matrix 441, 460 (2007); J.
Bauman, The “Déjà vu Effect,” Evaluation of United State Medical Device Legislation, Regulation, and the Food
and Drug Administration’s Contentious 510(k) Program, 67 Food & Drug L.J. 337, 360-61(2012).
77
See supra section II A.
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Premarket Review Pathways and Technology Certification
FDA forecasted under the proposed common IVCT regulatory framework that less than
ten percent of the tests would require premarket review.78 The sponsors of VALD seemed to have
foreseen that the expansion of the field of genetic test and laboratory medicine would require a
flexible system to accommodate the tens of thousands of tests without overburdening FDA and
test developers by requiring premarket review for all new and existing tests. 79
VALID would exempt a few categories of IVCTs from FDA review, such as grandfathered
tests, low-risk tests, tests for rare diseases, tests used for public health surveillance programs,
forensic tests, and tests used for law enforcement and employer testing that are not used to make
clinical decisions for individual patients. In addition, VALD added that IVCTs to be developed
and used under an emergency use authorization during public health crisis.
VALID established several risk-based IVCT pre-market review pathways to balance the
needs for innovation and timely access. High risk tests, such as FOAK tests, would be required to
undergo full premarket review to verify their analytical and clinical validity. Many components
and parts, such as test instruments and software, would receive abbreviated form of review—
special premarket review—depending on the type of component or part.
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U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Speech by Scott Gottlieb, M.D., Commissioner of Food and Drugs-Food and Drug
Administration: Blueprint for Breakthroughs - Charting the Course for Precision Medicine, (Sep.13, 2018).
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/speeches-fda-officials/blueprint-breakthroughs-charting-course-precisionmedicine-09132018-0.
79
As of March 2018, there were almost 75,000 genetic tests alone on the market in the United States, which an
average of 14 being added each day. See The Current Landscape of Genetic Testing: Market Growth,
Reimbursement Trends, Challenges and Opportunities, Concert Genetics (Apr. 2018).
http://www.concertgenetics.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/04/12_ConcertGenetics_CurrentLandscapeOfGeneticTesting2018.pdf.
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Most significantly, to protect test developers’ ability to modify tests rapidly and act nimbly
to meet patient needs, VALID introduced a new alternative pathway to premarket review:
technology certification. This pathway introduced the novel concept of “test groups,” which are
categorized primarily according to their indications for use and technology. Eligible IVCT
developers could choose to apply for the optional technology certification through FDA in lieu of
premarket review for certain eligible tests. To obtain a technology certification, the IVCT
developer is required to submit a representative test from the test group to FDA for review. If
approved, all other tests within the scope technology certification would market without additional
FDA premarket review. The certification would be valid for four years. To renew, the certificate
holder would be required to submit a different presentative test from the test group for FDA review.
To be eligible for technology certification, the developer must be in good standing, and the
IVCT cannot be an instrument, component, specimen receptacle, a reagent used in blood or tissue
banking, or a FOAK, home use, high risk, cross-referenced or direct-to-consumer (DTC) IVCT.
Most of the technology certification exclusion are categorical in nature, i.e., not risk based, except
for high risk IVCTs. For high risk IVCTs, VALID authorized the FDA to establish “mitigating
measures” that would render an otherwise high-risk test eligible for technology certification.
Mitigating measures are evidence-based requirements that are “necessary for IVCT to meet
applicable standard, or to mitigate risk of harm ensuing from an inaccurate result or
misinterpretation of any result. They would include “labeling, advertising performance standards,
performance testing, clinical studies, submission of clinical data, user comprehension studies,
postmarket studies, training, and conformance to standards.”
Further, VALID also included a breakthrough pathway to incentivize test development for
patients with unmet medical needs. This pathway is nearly identical to FDA’s current device
Page 22 of 31

Gaozhen Hang

breakthrough pathway for “more effective treatment or diagnosis of life-threatening or irreversibly
debilitating human disease or conditions compared to existing alternatives.”80
Grandfather and Transition Policies
Grandfathering is a critical feature of VALID, because it would exempt all previously
marketed tests from premarket review, including LDTs. This provision is designed to
accommodate the needs of LDT developers to protect patient access to currently available
laboratory tests.81 Grandfathered tests must have been developed by a laboratory with a high
complexity CLIA certificate and be used at the same laboratory in which they were developed. All
LDTs marketed 90 days prior to enactment of the VALID Act would be grandfathered into the
new system and would be exempted from premarket review. However, the intended use, analytical
or performance specifications or risk level had changed, the LDT would need to be reviewed by
FDA. In addition, if the LDT is high risk and was not already approved by the New York State
Department of Health for use, then laboratories would need to submit evidence for the test’s
analytical and clinical validity to FDA within five years.
The narrow definition of a grandfathered test means there will be tests on the market that
will not qualify for grandfathered status. Those “transitional IVCTs” include qualifying LDTs first
offered after enactment of the Act but before its effective date. Transitional IVCTs may continue
to be offered after the effective date so long as a marketing submission is made within 90 days
after the effective date. The FDA would retain the authority to enforce the device provisions of the
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U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staff, Breakthrough
Devices Program (Dec.18, 2018). https://www.fda.gov/media/108135/download.
81
See American Clinical Lab. Ass’n, ACLA Statement on the VALID Act of 2020 (Mar. 5, 2020).
https://www.acla.com/acla-statement-on-the-valid-act-of-2020/.
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FDCA and the Public Health Service Act for any transitional IVCTs as necessary to protect the
public health.
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IV.

Proposed Enhancements to VALID Act
VALID caters the unique needs of in vitro diagnostic tests, unifies regulation of all tests,

and grants FDA the clear authority to set risk-based review requirements for all tests, including
those tests developed and used in clinical laboratories. This proposed legislation would promote
and protect the public health by establishing consistent regulatory standards for test developers.
To secure these public health benefits, I recommend enhancements to refine three aspects of
VALID.
Address Duplicative CLIA Requirements
While the main goal of VALID is to establish a uniform federal regulatory framework for
diagnostics by closing the LDT regulatory gap in CLIA, VALID solidified FDA’s authority over
LDTs but without removing the burden from CMS’s oversight under CLIA—VALID does not
include a section to modernize or harmonize CLIA with the amended FDCA. This is a major
concern for the clinical laboratory communities, because the new LDT regulatory oversight
mandated by VALID may duplicate the current CLIA’s requirements.82 The laboratory
stakeholders’ concern of duplicative regulation is leveraged by another proposed legislation—
VITAL.83 VITAL sought to remove LDTs from the definition of device in FDCA and from FDA’s
jurisdiction altogether. Under VITAL, the regulatory oversight would be solely through CMS or
through a nongovernmental third party under CLIA. Interestingly, VITAL required laboratories to
submit test’s information, which would include the purpose of the test, the intended use of the test,
test methodology, and analytical and clinical validity information. Any significant modification
that would alter the methodology or clinical validity would require an amendment to the

82
83

See supra note 81.
See supra note 7.
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submission. Although this proposed regulatory scheme is not pragmatic because it would require
CMS to take on the scientific review of all LDTs—a task is neither within the scope of CMS nor
its expertise, VITAL made a compelling argument that any oversight approach should be least
burdensome without duplicative requirements.
Congress should include a provision in VALID to directly address this concern by
eliminating the overlapping requirements in CLIA. FDA’s existing regulations on quality system
requirements84 and adverse event reporting85 overlap with CLIA certification criteria, which
controls the quality of laboratory practices to ensure analytical validity of tests performed.86
Similar duplicative requirements would occur at the state level after VALID enactment, such as
those required by the New York State Department of Health. The bill sponsors should consider a
practical and reasonable approach to eliminate areas of duplication. For example, the previous
reiteration of VALID—the Diagnostic Accuracy and Innovation Act (DAIA) of 2018—includes a
separate section that would have updated the CLIA statute and initiated modernization of the CLIA
regulations to account for the new authority that FDA would be granted. 87 Specifically, DIDA
would have amended CLIA to limit the authority of CMS to exclusively regulate laboratory
operations: (1) modernize applicable quality requirements; (2) harmonized FDA and CLIA quality
terminology; (3) eliminate requirements related to test development, which would have been
regulated exclusively by FDA.
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21 C.F.R.§ 820.
21 C.F.R.§ 803.
86
See supra note 50.
87
See Personalized Medicine Coalition, The Diagnostic Accuracy and Innovation Act: Advancing innovation and
safety for patient in diagnostics. http://www.personalizedmedicinecoalition.org/Userfiles/PMCCorporate/file/DAIA_Summary.pdf
85
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Further, VALID would update FDCA to eliminate redundant requirements covered under
CLIA, the fear remains that FDA would not revise the current medical device regulations to the
extent to effectively eliminate duplication with CLIA. History has shown unilateral efforts from
one of the coordinating agencies without statutory amendment may not achieve the desired results.
For example, FDA took over the responsibility of the Center for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) in 2000 to categorize IVDs per CLIA level of complexity.88 CLIA has three levels of IVDs:
waived tests, moderate complexity tests, and high complexity tests.89 To be categorized as a CLIA
waived test, a test must meet both FDA’s premarket review and CLIA waiver requirements.
Despite FDA’s efforts to reduce the regulatory burden to meet patient needs90 (e.g., establishing
the dual 510(k) and CLIA waiver by application pathway91), IVD manufacturers are required to
meet both FDCA and CLIA statutory requirements. As a result, the number of CLIA waivered
tests remains low comparing to its non-waived peers.92
Build in Flexibility and Agility to the Common Regulatory Framework
VALID aims to design a regulatory system flexible and agile enough to evolve along with
rapid advances in technology. The key component of VALID is to establish risk-based oversight
because an effective and efficient regulatory scheme must balance the need to protect public health
and the need to promote innovation. While VALID proposed technology certification as an
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64 FR 73561 (Dec. 30, 1999); See also 69 FR 22849 (Apr. 27, 2004). In limited circumstances, FDA may choose
to consult with the Center for Disease Control and Prevention concerning test categorization. 42 C.F.R. § 493.17(c).
89
42 C.F.R. § 493.5(a).
90
As of March 2020, 75% of all CLIA certified laboratories in the United States are CLIA waived. U.S. Ctr. for
Medicare & Medicaid Serv., CLIA Statistical Tables/Graphs, Percent of CLIA Laboratories By Certificate Type.
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/CLIA/Downloads/statcer.pdf.
91
U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staff: Recommendations
for Dual 510(k) and CLIA Waiver by Application Studies (Feb. 26, 2020).
https://www.fda.gov/media/109574/download
92
In fiscal year 2019, FDA issued 13 CLIA waivers. FY2019 Performance Report to Congress for the Medical
Device User Fee Amendment, 13 (Sep. 30, 2019). https://www.fda.gov/media/139848/download
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alternative, least burdensome pathway to make efficient use of FDA resources, it categorically
excludes certain types of tests not based on product characteristics rather than risk. This approach
deviates from FDA’s well-established risk-based oversight guiding principles. FDA has
recognized the important of risk assessment in premarket review process.93 As described in the
FDA’s Benefit-Risk Guidance, a reasonable assurance of safety occurs when “it can be determined,
based upon valid scientific evidence, that the probable benefits . . . outweigh any probable risks,”
and can be demonstrated by establishing “the absence of unreasonable risk of illness or injury
associated with the use of the device for its intended uses and conditions of use.”94
Use of risk-based approach should apply for all IVCTs, regardless of product categories.
For example, VALID categorically excludes FOAK IVCTs from exemption, special premarket
review and technology certification. Although FOAK IVCTs can eventually be “redesignated,”
the redesignation would not take place until after the full premarket review has completed. As an
industry dedicated to innovation, new diagnostics frequently emerge as technology rapidly
advances. As a practical matter, many FOAK IVCTs will be low risk or otherwise not high risk
(i.e., low risk with mitigation measures), yet under VALID they would all essentially be treated as
high risk.
Under the current IVD regulatory system, the highly successful de novo process allows a
novel, non-Class III (i.e., low or moderate risk) test to be properly classified and reviewed in
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U.S. Food & Drug Admin. Guidance for Industry and FDA Staff: Factors to Consider when Making Benefit-Risk
Determinations in Medical Device Premarket Approval and De Novo Classifications (Aug. 30, 2019).(Benefit-Risk
Guidance) https://www.fda.gov/media/99769/download
94
Id. at 6 footnote 1 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 860.7(d)(1)).
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tandem.95 VALID contains no such mechanism. Congress should consider a similar pathway to
allow a test developer to obtain a determination that the IVCT is low risk or otherwise not high
risk (i.e., low risk with mitigation measures), at the onset of the review process. In addition,
VALID should give power to developers to appeal FDA’s risk classification decision, if developer
disagrees with the agency.
Strengthen Postmarket Powers
VALID proposed a risk-based flexible regulatory framework, which would enable FDA to
conduct an agile oversight for large numbers of IVCTs on the market. Since most new diagnostic
tests (90% by FDA’s estimate)96 would not be reviewed by FDA, the burden of ensuring safety
and effectiveness of IVCTs would shift from premarket to postmarket settings for nearly all tests.
This approach only works if FDA has effective postmarket surveillance tools and adequate
authorities to detect and respond safety concerns after products enter the market. In this regard
VALID needs to make two important changes.
First, legislator should remove restrictions on the important postmarket tool in VALID, the
Special Rule. This rule would allow FDA to act quickly when it becomes aware of a test that may
pose public health risk. VALID places the burden on the agency demonstrate that there is
insufficient scientific evidence to support the validity of the test, and that the test being offered
with deceptive or fraudulent claims or is reasonably likely to cause serious patient harm. These
requirements are inconsistent with the current agency’s postmarket enforcement tools for other
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U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staff, De Novo
Classification Process (Evaluation of Automatic Class III Designation) (Oct. 30, 2017).
https://www.fda.gov/media/72674/download
96
See supra note 78.
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medical products and would place an unnecessary evidentiary burden on the agency to exercise its
authority.
Second, Congress should preserve the existing mandatory adverse event reporting
requirements. Under the current IVD regulations, there are three mandatory reporter categories:
manufacturers, importers, and device user facilities. There is a long-standing mandate that doctors,
nurses, and other healthcare providers must report cases of test-related patient harm to FDA
because they are listed under the “device user facilities.” VALID only listed test developers as
mandatory reporters, and they are only required to report adverse events when they are not due to
laboratory errors under purview of CLIA. While this change may be an attempt to eliminate
confusing and costly jurisdiction overlap between FDA and CMS, 97 the unintended consequence
may hamper FDA’s ability to detect signals of a potentially faulty test. Reports from healthcare
providers regarding harm caused by inaccurate or misleading test results are an essential source of
information about the real-world performance of IVCTs.

97

See supra Section II B.
Page 30 of 31

Gaozhen Hang

CONCLUSION
The public and private sectors have been working together to tackle the IVD regulatory
oversight problem for many years. A comprehensive legislative reform seeking to modernize
diagnostics oversight to prevent testing crises and shortages during the public health emergencies
as well as during non-emergencies should consider the views of various diagnostic stakeholders:
IVD manufacturers, LDT developers, academic pathologists, reference laboratories, commercial
laboratories, healthcare providers, regulators, and patients. The common diagnostics regulatory
scheme proposed in the draft bill of VALID Act has received a bipartisan support in both the House
and the Senate, and it contains the necessary components of a pragmatic oversight aimed at
promoting innovation, improving patient and public health. As the bill continues to develop and
refine, the stakeholders would find common ground and a reasonable and practical approach to
regulator all in vitro clinical tests on the market.
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